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TAX CONSEQUENCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CLEANUP COSTS: THE UNCERTAINTY CONTINUES
LISA STEPHENSON*
In recent years, the Internal Revenue Service has issued several
advisory opinions which have attempted to resolve the question
regarding the proper tax treatment of environmental cleanup costs.
Unfortunately, these opinions have provided unclear answers and very
little guidance in resolving this issue.
Businesses may find themselves in precarious positions
because of potential liability for the substantial cleanup costs and the
unclear tax consequences afforded these enormous expenditures.
Today, businesses are under a tremendous amount of pressure from the
government and the public to clean up contaminated and hazardous
sites. In light of the recent attention given to brownfields
redevelopment, the pressure to clean up seems even greater.
Brownfields are commercial or industrial sites which, although
1
contaminated, have an active potential for redevelopment or reuse. It
is estimated that there are approximately 450,000 brownfields sites in
the United States.2 Usually these sites are not highly contaminated and
3
represent an unfortunate waste of commercial property. In an attempt
to combat this situation, the Environmental Protection Agency has
developed a National Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Project
which began in 1998.' This program enables interested parties to work
together to clean up and redevelop brownfields sites to restore them to
a productive use.5 Businesses, however, may be less inclined to
participate in such a program if they do not receive a favorable tax
treatment for the costs involved.
This Note addresses the tax treatment of environmental cleanup
costs. First, it discusses two relevant statutes under which a business
might incur liability for environmental remediation expenses. Next, it
considers the possible tax treatments of these costs. It then examines
recent court opinions and IRS rulings on the proper tax consequences.
'Senior StaffMember, Journal of Natural Resources& Environmental Law; J.D., 1998
University of Kentucky; currently enrolled in LLM program in taxation at New York University.
'U.S. EPA PRESS ADVISORY, Oct. 20, 1997, 1997 WL 642978, at *1.
2
U.S. EPA PRESS ADVISORY, Aug. 8, 1997, 1997 WL 451483, at *2.
31d.
4
U.S. EPA PRESS ADVISORY, Oct. 20, 1997, 1997 WL 642978, at * 1.
ld.
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Finally, it concludes with a discussion of a relevant section of the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
I.

STATUTES COMPELLING REMEDIATION OF

HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

A. Environmental Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) broadly defines four classes of people
who are potentially liable for cleaning a site where hazardous
substances have been released.'
These parties are known as
"potentially responsible parties" (PRPs) and include the following: (1)
the current owner or operator of a site;' (2) previous owners or
operators of a site; 8 (3) persons who arranged for disposal, treatment,
or transport of hazardous substances disposed of at the site;9 and (4)
persons who transported hazardous substances to the site. ° CERCLA
imposes strict liability for cleanup of sites in these broad categories of
PRPs." Liability is also joint and several so that a PRP is potentially
liable for the entire cleanup of the site. 2
CERCLA forces PRPs to incur cleanup costs in one of three
ways. First, under CERCLA, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) may issue an order compelling PRPs to remediate the
contaminated site themselves. 3 Second, CERCLA allows PRPs to
bring cost recovery actions against other PRPs for reimbursement of
actual cleanup expenses incurred.14 Third, CERCLA provides for a
federal fund, the "Superfund," from which the government may use
money to clean a site.' The government may then bring a cost recovery
action against PRPs for reimbursement of these expenses. 6 Thus, even
though a PRP may not actually perform the cleanup of the site, the PRP
remains liable for those costs under other provisions of CERCLA.

642 U.S.C. §9607(a) (1988).
742 U.S.C. §9607(a)(1) (1988).
842 U.S.C. §9607(a)(2) (1988).
942 U.S.C. §9607(a)(3) (1988).
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4) (1988).
"See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
2
See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
1'42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
"42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
"542 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
642 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
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B. Environmental Cleanup Costs Pursuant to RCRA
Unlike CERCLA, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) is primarily concerned with current waste management
operations, rather than waste disposal sites that are no longer in use.
The RCRA regulatory scheme contains provisions for compelling the
cleanup of contaminated property at all stages of the waste management
cycle, from the production of waste to the disposal of waste.
RCRA permits private citizens to bring an action in federal
court to obtain an order ceasing any release of solid or hazardous waste
which poses an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to the
environment. 7 Under this provision of RCRA, the general remedy is
8
injunctive relief, but parties may recover past response costs.' RCRA
may force owners of underground storage tanks to remediate any
releases from such tanks. 19
RCRA, although not as broad as CERCLA, can pose a risk of
compelled remediation of contaminated property upon owners and
operators in certain circumstances. In most instances, RCRA simply
broadens the liability imposed under CERCLA.
In addition to CERCLA and RCRA, parties associated with
contaminated property must also be cognizant of potential liability
arising from state statutory provisions, local regulations, and contract
provisions.
H. TAX TREATMENT

OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS

A. An Underlying Theory: The Matching Principle
Throughout the Internal Revenue Code (Code), a general
is
attempt made to match expenses with the corresponding revenues for
which those expenses are incurred in order to arrive at an accurate
measurement of a taxpayer's net income. This principle is helpful in
determining whether certain expenses should be currently deductible or
capitalized.
In general, under the matching principle, expenditures should
be capitalized if they result in the creation of an asset or provide

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(I)(B) (1988).
"See KFC W., Inc. v. Mcghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct.
41(1995).
"42 U.S.C. §6991 (1988).
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significant future benefits."0 However, other expenses arising from
liabilities incurred in the course of yearly trade or business activities
can be deducted in the current taxable year.2'
B. Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses: Section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code
Section 162 of the Code allows deductions for "all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business., 22 Courts have interpreted the
meaning of "ordinary" and "necessary" in the context of §162.
Deputy v. Du Pont?3 construed the meaning of "ordinary" as
used in §162. The United States Supreme Court determined that an
expense is an "ordinary" expense if it is a common one in the course of
one's business. 24 The Court then stated that a particular expense could
be "ordinary" even though it occurred only once in the taxpayer's
existence, but that the transactions that produce the expense must be of
common occurrence in the type of business in which it is incurred.25
Whether an expense is an ordinary expense depends upon the
transactions from which it arose and its "normalcy" in the particular
business in which it was incurred.26
In Commissionerv. Tellier,27 the United States Supreme Court
construed the "ordinary and necessary" requirement. In Tellier, the
issue presented to the Court was whether expenses incurred by a
taxpayer in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution qualified
for deduction from taxable income under §162 of the Code. The Court
determined that the legal expenses were "ordinary and necessary"
within the meaning of §162.28 The Court emphasized that the term
"necessary" required only that the expense be "appropriate and helpful"
to the taxpayer's business. 29 The Court then determined that the term
"ordinary" in §162 was used primarily to.distinguish between those
expenses that are currently deductible and those expenses that are

20

°IR.C. §263; INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 83 (1992).

2"IR.C. §162;1NDOPCO,Inc., 502 U.S. at 83.
22

1.R.C. §162(a).

"Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
41d at 495.
25id
26

Id

v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966).
"Id. at 690.
29d. at 689 (quoting Welch v. Commissioner, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933)).
17Commissioner
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capital iri nature and must be amortized over the useful life of the
asset.3 °

In view of the relevant case law, an expense may be currently
deductible under § 162 if it is appropriate and helpful in conducting the
taxpayer's business and if it is commonly and frequently incurred in the
type of business that the taxpayer conducts. An expense may still
qualify as ordinary even though only incurred once in the lifetime of a
business. This last conclusion is significant for a taxpayer confronting
environmental cleanup costs because such costs may only be incurred
once in the lifetime of a particular business.
Section 1.162-4 of the Treasury Regulations accompanying

§162 of the Code addresses the issue of incidental repairs to property.
Under §1.162-4, a repair will qualify for a current deduction only if all
of the following conditions are met: (1) the expenditure is incidental;
(2) the expenditure does not materially increase the value of the
property; (3) the expenditure does not significantly prolong the useful
life of the property; and (4) the purpose of the expenditure is to keep the
property in an ordinarily efficient operating condition.3' Section 1.1624 further provides that repairs in the nature of replacements must be
capitalized and depreciated to the extent that the repairs slow
deterioration and appreciably prolong the life of the property. 2 This
regulation is significant in environmental cleanup cases because
taxpayers often attempt to show that cleanup costs constitute incidental
repairs that should be currently deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses.
In the seminal case of IllinoisMerchants TrustCo.,33 the United
States Board of Tax Appeals distinguished between incidental repairs
and capital improvements based on the purpose of the expenditure.34
The court noted that the purpose of a repair is to keep property in an
ordinarily efficient operating condition.35 In contrast, the purpose of a
capital improvement is to prolong the life of the property, increase its
value, or make it adaptable to a new or different use. 6

30Id.
Reg. § 1.162-4 (1960).
"Treas.
'21d.
Illlinois Merchant Trust Co., 4 B.T.A. 103 (1926).
'41d. at 106.
31d.
36d.
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C. Capital Expenditures: Section 263 of the Internal Revenue Code
Section 263 ofthe Code prohibits current deductions for capital
expenditures." Section 263(a)(1) provides that no deduction is allowed
for "[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent
improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property
or estate."3' Section 263(a)(2) of the Code provides that no deduction
is allowed for "[a]ny amount expended in restoring property or in
making good the exhaustion thereof for which an allowance is or has
been made in the form of a deduction for depreciation, amortization, or
depletion." 39 The Regulations accompanying §263 of the Code provide
guidance as to what constitutes a capital expenditure. Section 1.263 (a)1(b) of the Regulations states that capital expenditures include amounts
incurred "(1) [T]o add to the value, or substantially prolong the useful
life, of property owned by the taxpayer, such as a plant or equipment,
or (2) to adapt property to a new or different use."4 An example of a
capital expenditure is provided in §1.263(a)-2(a) of the Regulations as:
"The cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings,
machinery and equipment, furniture and fixtures, and similar property
having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year."'"
Significantly, many courts have held that costs incurred as part
of a general plan of rehabilitation, modernization, or improvement of
property must be capitalized.42 The courts have reached this conclusion
even though the same costs might be currently deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expenses, if incurred independently.43
HI. OPINIONS AND RULINGS ON THE TAX TREATMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS

A. The Plainfield-Union Test
Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner44 sets forth a
value of property standard that many taxpayers have argued to justify

§263(a).
§263(a)(I).
§263(a)(2).
Reg. §1.263(a)-l(b).
4Treas. Reg. §1.263(a)-2(a).
4"See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 816, 820-22 (10th Cir.
"I.R.C.
"I.R.C.
"I.R.C.
"Treas.
1971).

43See id. at 820; United States v. W.J. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968).

"Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962).
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a current deduction of cleanup costs. In Plainfield-Union,the taxpayer
was a public utility which supplied water to its customers via a system
of water mains and pipes.45 When these pipes were originally installed,
they were painted internally with tar.46 Acidic water eventually forced
the tar coating to push up which reduced the carrying capacity of the
pipes.47 The taxpayer was forced to clean and reline the pipes with
cement in order to restore the carrying capacity of the pipes.4" The
taxpayer deducted these cleaning and lining expenses as ordinary and
necessary business expenses.49 The Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer
that the costs of cleaning and lining the pipes was a repair which could
be properly deducted in the taxable year in which the costs were
incurred.50 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that the proper
test considers "whether the expenditure materially enhances the value,
use, life expectancy, strength, or capacity as compared with the status
of the asset prior to the condition necessitating the expenditure."'" The
court felt that the cleaning and lining of the pipes did not prolong the
useful life of the taxpayer's assets, nor did it change or enhance the use
or capacity of the assets.52 Additionally, the court noted that these costs
were not incurred as part of a general plan of rehabilitation. 3 Given
these findings, the court held the costs were an ordinary and necessary
business expense which could be deducted currently.
B. IRS Rulings on the Tax Treatment of Environmental Cleanup Costs

The Internal Revenue Service has issued several Tax Advice
Memoranda (TAMs) and Revenue Rulings on the tax treatment of

environmental cleanup costs. Although both types of advisory opinions
are instructive as to the Service's viewpoint, the TAMs are less helpful
54
than revenue rulings because they carry no precedential value.

4

1d at 334.
"IJd.
171d. at 335.
1"id. at 336.
491d.

m1d. at 337.
51
1d. at 338.
52
1d '

53

1d.
I.R.C. §61100)(3) (1988).
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1. Technical Advice Memorandum 92-40-004
Technical advice memorandum (TAM) 92-40-004 considered
whether the costs of removing and replacing asbestos insulation in
manufacturing equipment should be deducted or capitalized. The
taxpayer's manufacturing facility contained equipment insulated with
asbestos." The taxpayer employed an asbestos abatement program as
required by certain state and federal regulations and to enhance the
health and safety of its workers. 6 Accordingly, the taxpayer removed
the asbestos insulation from its equipment and replaced it with less
efficient insulation. 7 The taxpayer then deducted these removal costs
as deductible repair expenses in the year in which they were incurred. st
The taxpayer presented several justifications for its tax
treatment of these costs. First, the taxpayer argued that the removal and
replacement costs did not add value to the equipment nor did they
prolong the useful life of the equipment. 9 The taxpayer also argued
that the replacement costs did not convert the equipment to a new or
different use.6" The new insulation performed the same function as the
old asbestos insulation. 6' Moreover, the taxpayer argued that the
expenditures were not incurred as part of a general plan of
rehabilitation and thus should not be capitalized as such.62 Finally, the
taxpayer contended that these were costs for incidental repairs, not
permanent improvements.63
The IRS held that the taxpayer's removal and replacement costs
should be capitalized." These costs increased the value of the
taxpayer's equipment due to the elimination of the health risks posed by
the asbestos. 65 Also, the taxpayer's property was more marketable to
potential buyers after the asbestos was removed.66 Additionally, the
IRS refused to apply the Plainfield-Union67 value test. 6 The IRS noted

"Tech. Adv. Mem. 9240-004 (June 29, 1992).
16Id.

Pid.
5"Id.

"Id.
6"Id.
611d.

621d.
631d.

Id.
65id.

"6Id "

"7Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962).
"Tech. Adv. Mem. 9240-004 (June 29, 1992).
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that the value test was only applicable where repairs to the property are
necessitated due to progressive deterioration. 69 Here, the replacement
of the insulation was not necessitated by the deterioration of the
equipment but because of human health risks.7" Furthermore, the IRS
stated that the value test could not be applied because the taxpayer's
equipment was manufactured with asbestos and therefore could not be
valued prior to the existence of the asbestos. 7'
The IRS further stated that reparations made to bring property
into compliance with governmental regulations increase the value of the
repaired property because it allows the taxpayer to continue its
operations.72 Finally, the IRS noted that the replacement of insulation
was a permanent change to the property that would produce benefits
beyond the taxable year in which the expenses were incurred." The
future benefits that would accrue to the taxpayer included safer working
74
conditions, reduced risk of liability, and increased marketability.
2. Technical Advice Memorandum 93-15-004
In April 1993, the IRS issued TAM 93-15-00475which held that
the costs of particular environmental cleanup activities were capital
expenditures. The costs incurred by the taxpayer, and addressed by the
IRS, were associated with a plan to remediate soil and equipment
contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).76 The PCB
contamination resulted from the past operation of equipment, and from
previous PCB removal and disposal undertakings.77 The taxpayer was
in violation of several statutes including RCRA and the Toxic
Substances Control Act 78 (TSCA). 79 The taxpayer agreed to remediate
the property and treated all the costs ofremediation, except for the costs
ofremediation equipment and groundwater monitoring wells, as current
expenses.

69
1d.
70

1d

71

d

721d.
3
7 1d.
4
7 d.

7Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (April 16, 1993).
761d.
77ld
7"15 U.S.C §§2601-2692 (1988 & Supp V 1993).

7"Tech. Adv. Mem 93-15-004 (April 16, 1993).
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In its claim that the remediation expenses were currently
deductible, the taxpayer first argued that the costs were repairs.8" The
IRS disagreed holding that the costs were replacements and
betterments, not incidental repairs." The IRS first noted that the
expenditures resulted from the taxpayer's choice to forego regular
maintenance which eventually necessitated an extensive cleanup. 2 The
IRS believed the taxpayer could have avoided any extraordinary
cleanup costs by properly disposing of the wastes initially. 3
Significantly, the IRS stated that the taxpayer's unawareness as to the
appropriate disposal method was irrelevant. ' Instead, the proper focus
was on the "work being performed" in the cleanup, not on the
taxpayer's knowledge or good intentions.85 Next, the Service found that
the expenditures were incurred as part of a systematic plan of
remediation that required capitalization of such expenditures.86 Finally,
the IRS found that the taxpayer's property would be more valuable after
the remediation signifying an improvement to the property rather than
a repair."
3. Technical Advice Memorandum 94-11-002
TAM 94-11-002 considered the proper tax treatment for two
types of asbestos cleanup costs: 1) costs associated with the removal
of asbestos from a portion of the taxpayer's property; and 2) costs
associated with the encapsulation of asbestos on a portion of the
taxpayer's property. 8 The taxpayer was a corporation that rented
warehouse space. 9 The property involved consisted of a warehouse
and a boiler house located on the same land.' In order to obtain
financing from a bank, the taxpayer was required to remove asbestoscontaining equipment from the boiler house and to correct its asbestos
problems in its warehouse facility.9 1 The taxpayer completely cleared
the boiler house of all asbestos-containing equipment and subsequently

'Old.
81ld.
21d.
94Id.

85

Id.
"Id.
7
'1d.
"Tech. Adv. Memn. 94-11-002 (March 18, 1994).
891d.
'Old.
911d
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converted the boiler house into a garage and office space.92 Within the
warehouse, the taxpayer re-wrapped and encapsulated damaged
portions of pipe containing asbestos insulation.93 The encapsulation
procedure involved applying canvas and plastic wrapping over damaged
portions of pipe.94 The taxpayer then deducted both removal and
encapsulation costs as ordinary and necessary business expenses.9"
As to the removal costs associated with the boiler house
cleanup, the IRS disagreed with the taxpayer's treatment and held that
these costs should be capitalized.' The taxpayer argued that these costs
were incidental repair costs that should be currently deducted.97 The
IRS, however, held that these costs added to the value of the property
and adapted the property to a different use.98 First, the Service noted
that the complete removal of asbestos permanently eliminated any
future health risks." Next, the IRS noted that the removal of asbestos
increased the value of the property for potential buyers.'0 0 Also,
removal costs were not incurred to return the boiler house to its original
condition, but rather to enhance its usefulness and capacity.'' The
boiler house had been adapted to a new and different use that
necessitated capitalization of the costs involved in this process."'
Finally, the IRS noted that the removal of the asbestos was not a
which eliminated
temporary repair, but rather a permanent improvement
03
all the contamination in the boiler house.1
In contrast, the IRS agreed with the taxpayer that the
encapsulation costs for the warehouse property could be currently
deducted.0 4 In so holding, the IRS believed that these were temporary
measures that could be characterized fairly as incidental repairs." 5
These costs did not appreciably increase the value of the property,
prolong its useful life, or completely eliminate the threat of exposure to
asbestos in the warehouse.' 0 6
92Id.
93Id

9Id.
91d

961d
97Id

98Id.
"Id
,01d.
1011d.
1I21d.

1'31d.
10Id,

105Id.
106Id.
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4. Revenue Ruling 94-3 8
Revenue Ruling 94-38 instructed that cleanup costs incurred to
treat land groundwater that a taxpayer contaminated with hazardous
waste from its business are deductible by the taxpayer as ordinary and
The ruling
necessary business expenses under §162 of the Code.'
further instructed that consideration expenses for groundwater
treatment facilities are capital expenditures under §263."'
The pertinent facts of the ruling are as follows. The taxpayer
owned and operated a manufacturing plant it built on land that was
uncontaminated when purchased by the taxpayer.'0 9 During the plant's
operations, it discharged hazardous waste which it buried on portions
of the land. !"0 In complying with anticipated federal, state, and local
environmental regulations, the taxpayer undertook remediation of the
Additionally, the taxpayer installed a
soil and groundwater."'
groundwater monitoring system to guarantee that the remediation had
removed all the hazardous waste and to provide for continual future
monitoring of the land." 2 The soil remediation and groundwater
treatment was undertaken to restore the taxpayer's land to the same
physical condition that existed prior to the contamination.'
The ruling first considered the extent to which the expenditure
would produce significant future benefits." 4 The Service determined
that the newly constructed groundwater treatment facilities had a useful
life substantially beyond the taxable year in which they were
constructed and were therefore capital expenditures under §263.' The
ruling then stated that the soil remediation expenditures and the
ongoing groundwater treatment expenditures (other than the costs of
constructing the facilities) were not permanent improvements to the
taxpayer's land and did not otherwise provide significant future
benefits." 6 They merely restored the soil and groundwater to their pre-

"°'Rev.Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.

108M."

1 old

1111d.
1121d
1131d
I141d.
1151d "
"16
Id .

1997-98]

TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CLEANUP COSTS

contamination condition." 7 Thus, these expenditures were ordinary and
8
necessary business expenses that were currently deductible."
The ruling adopted the value test as set forth in PlainfieldUnion Water Company v. Commissioner19 for determining whether a
20
The test
particular expenditure increases the value of property.
status
the
with
expenditure
the
after
asset
the
of
status
"the
compares
the
necessitated
that
arose
condition
the
of that asset before
2
the
after
land
the
of
condition
the
compared
ruling
expenditure." ' The
2
contaminated.
was
it
before
land
the
cleanup with the condition of
Because the taxpayer had merely returned the land and groundwater to
their conditions before the contamination, the soil remediation and
ongoing water treatment expenditures did not result in improvements
23
This ruling
that increased the value of the taxpayer's property.'
ruling's
revenue
prior
affected Revenue Ruling 88-57.24 It rejected the
implication that the value test was the appropriate test only in a case
25
where there was sudden and unanticipated damage to property.'
Therefore, the value test is appropriate where there is sudden and
unanticipated contamination of property and where the damage to
property is a foreseeable result of continuous or long-term
contamination.
In September 1995, the IRS issued a memorandum that casts
doubt on the current deductibility of cleanup costs. The TAM
suggested that most costs associated with the cleanup of property
26
contaminated prior to purchase by the taxpayer must be capitalized.'
A corporate predecessor of the taxpayer purchased property that had
7
Several years later, the
been used as a site for the disposal of wastes.
for use as a public
government
county
the
to
land
taxpayer donated the
8
reconveyed the
county
the
contamination,
the
discovering
park. After
property to the taxpayer.'29 Subsequently, the property was investigated

7

" 1d"
117Id.

11939T.C. 333, 338 (1962).
20

' Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
1211d"

22

1

23

Id.

1 1d.

4
11 Rev.

Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36.

'Rev. Rul, 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
I16Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995).
17Id.

"oId.
118Md"
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and placed on the National Priorities List under CERCLA. 3 ° The
taxpayer then entered into a Consent Decree with the Environmental
Protection Agency and agreed to perform an investigation into the
extent of the contamination and the development of plans for a cleanup
of the property. 3 '
At the time the TAM was sought, the taxpayer had not yet
The taxpayer had incurred
incurred any actual remediation costs.'
three other types of costs: (1) consulting costs for the investigation of
the site; (2) legal fees related to negotiation and drafting of the Consent
Decree; and (3) consulting fees for lobbying, public relations, and
engineering.133 The TAM noted that current tax deductions are a matter
of legislative grace.' 34 Capitalization of costs is the norm and the
taxpayer must meet its burden of proof in order to show that costs
should be currently deductible. 135 The taxpayer in this advice
memorandum failed to meet3 its burden of proof with regard to all three
types of claimed expenses. 1
The taxpayer argued that following Revenue Ruling 94-3 8 these
expenditures were currently deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses.' 37 The IRS ruled that Revenue Ruling 94-3 8 did not
apply to the taxpayer's situation. 38 TAM 95-41-005 states that
Revenue Ruling 94-38 only applies if the taxpayer acquired the
property in an uncontaminated condition, contaminated the property in
the course of its everyday business operations, and later incurred costs
to restore the property to its condition at the time of acquisition. 3 9 The
IRS construed the facts such that the taxpayer acquired the land when
the property was reconveyed by the county, not when the taxpayer
The TAM suggests that costs
originally purchased the land. 4
associated with the cleanup of preexisting contamination must always
be capitalized.
The TAM also explained that, under appropriate circumstances,

a taxpayer could deduct the costs of performing an environmental

0
13
d.

131d.
1321d.

"'I3d
"

134d

"

135Id
136Id.
137Id.

1381d.
391d.

1I4Od.
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investigation or study under § 162 of the Code if the taxpayer
that the amounts were incurred in the ordinary course of
demonstrated
41
business.'
As to the legal fees, the TAM explained that the determination
of whether legal fees are deductible under §162 or capitalized under
§263, is made by examining the nature of the matter with respect to
which the costs were incurred. 4 2 Legal fees are appropriately
4
1
capitalized if they were incurred to facilitate the cleanup.
The main importance of the TAM is its narrow reading of Rev.
Rul. 94-38. The facts of TAM 95-41-005 are very similar to the facts
of Rev. Rul. 94-38 which suggests that their tax outcomes should be
similar. Yet, the IRS held that the cleanup costs in the revenue ruling
should be deductible currently while holding that the costs in the TAM
should be capitalized. Apparently, the IRS refuses to apply the revenue
ruling to situations where the taxpayer acquires contaminated property
and then undertakes remediation of the property to restore the land to
an uncontaminated condition.
5. Technical Advice Memorandum 97-19-007
In May 1997, the IRS issued a TAM that instructed that the
costs incurred by the taxpayer for the design, acquisition, and
construction of a Spent Nuclear Fuel Interim Storage Facility (SNFISF)
were capital expenditures under §263'" The taxpayer was a public
45
utility operating a nuclear-steam powered electric generating plant.
Fuel assemblies in the plant were handled underwater and temporarily
stored in spent fuel pools for cooling. ' The taxpayer and other utilities
anticipated that the spent nuclear fuel would be removed from the spent
fuel pool after ten years of cooling and then sent away for
reprocessing. 147 However, the anticipated reprocessing facilities were
never constructed in the United States.44 The taxpayer then entered
into a contract with the Department of Energy under which the
Department agreed to hold taxpayer's spent fuel until the radioactive

11Id.

1431d.

'Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-19-007 (May 9, 1997).
14Id.
'4id.
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isotopes decayed to a safe level.'49 Even with the contract, the taxpayer
realized that a storage facility could not be established by the
government before the taxpayer's spent fuel pools reached capacity. 5
To avoid shutting down the plant, the taxpayer chose to build its own
interim storage facility and selected on-site dry cask encapsulation to
handle its spent fuel.' The taxpayer then entered into a contract with
another corporation for the design and acquisition of several dry
casks. 2 Once the dry casks were built, they could not be used for
transporting the spent fuel to the government's storage facility. As a
result, the casks were to be scrapped once permanent storage became
available. 3 Additionally, the taxpayer was forced to design and
construct a concrete pad on which to place the casks.' 54
The taxpayer sought advice on how to treat the numerous types
of costs involved. These costs included: costs for design, acquisition,
and construction of the SNFISF, the concrete pad, the dry casks and
related equipment; costs of environmental studies; and costs of
regulatory approvals related to the acquisition and construction of the
SNFISF. "'
The taxpayer argued that the costs were ordinary and necessary
business expenses that should be currently deductible.' 56 First, the
taxpayer argued that the purpose of the expenditures was to temporarily
store hazardous materials, not to produce future income or generate any
future benefit.' 5 The taxpayer contended that the expenditure for the
SNFISF added no appreciable value to its plant.' 58 The IRS rejected
these arguments stating that the taxpayer had incurred costs to construct
capital assets with a useful life beyond the taxable year.' 9 All costs
associated with the design, acquisition, and construction of the facility
were expenditures for permanent improvements to the taxpayer's plant
that increased the property's value under §263.160 The IRS felt that the
taxpayer's situation was analogous to the taxpayer's situation in
Revenue Ruling 94-38 in that the taxpayer in that ruling was required
49

1 1d

"Id.
15
1Id.
1521d

133d.
154Id.
1551d.
156Id.

1571d.

16ld.

TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CLEANUP COSTS

1997-98]

to capitalize the portion of its costs relating to the construction of its
groundwater treatment facilities. 6' The IRS pointed out in that ruling
it was found that the newly constructed facilities constituted the
construction of an asset with a useful life substantially beyond the
taxable year in which it was built. 6 '
The taxpayer then argued that the authority of H.G. Fenton
MaterialCo. v. Commissioner 63 controlled.' In Fenton, the taxpayer
operated a mining business.' 65 The taxpayer disposed of waste products
by hauling them and depositing them on other property it owned.'"
Subsequently, the taxpayer attempted to currently deduct all the related
costs as ordinary and necessary business expenses.'67
The Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer that the expenses were
currently deductible.' 68 First, the court determined that the disposal
costs were ordinary and necessary business expenses because they were
69
necessarily incurred in order to avoid clogging the mine.' Second, the
court found that the taxpayer's use of its own property for dumping was
not determinative of capitalization because taxpayer could have paid
another party to remove the waste and this expense would have been
currently deductible. 7 ° The court then concluded that any present
benefit to the property was merely incidental and any future benefit to
the property was purely speculative.' 7 '
In TAM 97-19-007, the IRS did not believe that the taxpayer's
situation was analogous to Fenton.172 Unlike Fenton, the IRS found
of taxpayer's expenditures was not incidental or
that capital effect
73
speculative.
The taxpayer also argued that its expenditures should not be
capitalized because the constructed facilities would not produce future
income. 74 The IRS disagreed, stating that courts have held that costs
may be capitalized even where the asset created does not directly
16
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produce future income.' 75 The IRS then emphasized the holding in
Woolrich Woolen Mills v. United States, '76
where the taxpayer was
required to capitalize the costs of constructing a water filtration plant,
although the plant was not a productive part of the taxpayer's
manufacturing operations. 17 7 In this opinion, the Third Circuit reasoned
that although the plant was not used in the taxpayer's manufacturing
operations, it was an indispensable part of the total business property
of the taxpayer.' 8 In conclusion, in the request for technical advice, the
IRS believed that the SNFISF was a part of the taxpayer's total business
property even if unnecessary to the plant's primary operations.
Finally, the taxpayer argued that the temporary nature of the
SNFISF prohibited the capitalization of the expenditures. The IRS
rejected this argument as well, stating that the Tax Court has required
taxpayers to capitalize the construction costs of temporary facilities
used until the completion of permanent facilities." 9 Thus, the interim
status of the dry casks was irrelevant to the consideration of whether the
costs should be capitalized or currently deductible.
IV. CONCLUSION
As is apparent from these recent rulings, given the same set of
facts, taxpayers and the IRS often reach different conclusions about the
proper tax treatment of environmental cleanup costs. The controversial
question as to whether these costs should be currently deductible or
capitalized remains unsolved today and hinges on a judicious factintensive analysis. It seems reasonably certain that the IRS will
continue to apply the Plainfield-Union value test to allow current
deductions for costs associated with the cleanup of property that was
uncontaminated before acquisition by the taxpayer. This confers a
favorable tax treatment on taxpayers who remedy contamination caused
by the taxpayers themselves on their own land. It appears equally
certain that the IRS will continue to require capitalization of the same
costs incurred to restore property which was contaminated before
purchase by the taxpayer. As for other cleanup schemes, the relevant
inquiry will examine all the facts and circumstances of the case. In

"See Russel Box Co. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 452 (lst Cir. 1953).
"6Woolrich Woolen Mills v. United States, 289 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1961).
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Memo 1993-243).
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general, the relevant factors to consider with respect to cleanup costs
include: (1) creation of a new asset; (2) giving an old asset a new or
different use; (3) significant increase in the life of an asset; (4) whether
the costs are part of a general plan of rehabilitation; and (5) an increase
in the value of an asset. If any of these factors are met, it is likely that
the IRS will require capitalization of such costs.
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 provided some guidance to
1 80 Enacted
taxpayers for expensing environmental remediation costs.
on August 13, 1997, §198 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
a taxpayer may elect to treat as a current deduction certain qualified
1
environmental remediation expenditures."' A qualified environmental
remediation expenditure is defined as one which is normally capitalized
and which is incurred as a result of a hazardous substances mitigation
82
process at a qualified contaminated site. A qualified contaminated
site is income-generating property held for use in a trade or business
with a targeted area on which there has been a release of any hazardous
substance.1 3 Targeted areas include: (1) a population census tract with
a poverty rate of 20 percent or more; (2) other population census tracts
which are zoned for commercial and industrial use and are adjacent to
at least one other population census tract; (3) any empowerment zone
or enterprise community; and (4) any site the Environmental Protection
Agency has announced before February 1, 1997 as a brownfields pilot
project.' Section 198 terminates, however, and shall not apply to
remediation expenditures incurred after December 31, 2000.185 Thus,
as long as the taxpayer can fit under all the provisions of §198, the
taxpayer is assured that its environmental remediation costs can be
currently deducted.
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